-re  ,         nw*,  UJ^X,A» 

INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  SAFETY  COVERING  THE 
INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON  THE  CHI- 
CAGO GREAT  WESTERN  RAILWAY  NEAR  WYETH,  MO.,  ON  JANUARY 
3,  1920. 

April  29,  1921. 
To  the  Commission  : 

On  January  3,  1920,  there  was  a  derailment  of  a  passenger  train 
on  the  Chicago  Great  Western  Railway  near  Wyeth,  Mo.,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  death  of  1  passenger,  and  the  injury  of  79  passengers  and 
3  Pullman  employees.  As  a  result  of  the  investigation  of  this  acci- 
dent I  submit  the  following  report: 

The  accident  occurred  on  the.  seventh  district  of  the  southern 
division,  a  single-track  line  extending  between  Leavenworth  and  Con- 
ception, Mo.,  a  distance  of  74.2  miles,  over  which  trains  are  operated 
by  time-table  and  train  orders.  Proceeding  westward  from  the 
station  at  Wyeth  there  is  912  feet  of  tangent,  followed  by  a  3-degree 
curve  to  the  left  846  feet  in  length,  1,678  feet  of  tangent,  and  a  2- 
degree  curve  to  the  left,  679  feet  in  length.  The  accident  occurred 
on  this  latter  curve  at  a  point  427  feet  west  of  its  eastern  end.  The 
grade  from  Wyeth  is  practically  level  for  1,750  feet,  followed  by  a 
descending  grade  to  the  point  of  accident,  varying  from  0.29  per  cent 
to  0.83  per  cent.  The  track  is  laid  with  85-pound  rails,  33  feet  in 
length,  single  spiked  to  an  average  of  18  oak  ties  to  the  rail,  ballasted 
with  stone  and  cinders  to  a  depth  of  from  8  to  12  inches.  Tie-plates 
are  used  on  curves.  The  rails  were  laid  in  the  track  in  October,  1904. 
The  general  condition  of  the  track  was  fairly  good,  although  many 
of  the  rails  were  not  in  good  condition.  At  the  time  of  the  accident 
the  weather  was  cold  and  partly  cloudy. 

The  train  involved  in  this  accident  was  westbound  passenger  train 
No.  3,  en  route  from  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.  It 
consisted  of  1  mail  car,  1  baggage  car,  1  smoking  car,  1  day 
coach,  and  8  Pullman  sleeping  cars,  in  the  order  given,  hauled 
by  engines  923  and  286,  and  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Cavanaugh 
and  Enginemen  Venn  and  Peavy.  It  passed  Rea,  3.3  miles  east  of 
Wyeth  and  the  last  open  telegraph  office,  at  7.17  a.  m.,  3  hours  and 
8  minutes  late,  and  at  about  7.26  a.  m.  was  derailed  at  a  point  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  west  of  Wyeth  while  traveling  at  a  speed 
estimated  to  have  been  about  40  or  45  miles  an  hour. 

The  two  engines  and  the  first  three  cars  came  to  a  stop  about 
2,100  feet  beyond  the  point  of  derailment,  wit^"  o1nlylJ^\|arjwa3'tT  pq(r 


of  wheels  of  the  rear  truck  of  the  baggage  car  derailed.    All  of  the 
remaining  cars  in  the  train  were  derailed  to  the  left  side  of  the 

47603—21—1 


U.S.  0EPO«TO«Y 


2  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

track.  The  day  coach  was  derailed  just  before  passing  over  bridge 
F-460,  a  96-foot  plate-girder  structure,  located  630  feet  beyond  the 
initial  point  of  derailment,  and  after  passing  over  the  bridge  went 
down  a  20-foot  embankment,  coming  to  rest  about  50  feet  from  the 
track.  The  first  and  second  sleeping  cars  went  down  the  embankment 
just  before  reaching  the  bridge,  coming  to  rest  on  their  sides  at  a  point 
about  50  feet  from  the  track.  The  third  sleeping  car  came  to  rest 
in  an  upright  position  with  its  forward  end  down  the  embankment 
and  the  rear  end  resting  on  the  roadbed,  being  almost  at  right  angles 
to  the  track.  The  fourth  sleeping  car  remained  upright  with  its 
forward  end  close  to  the  rails  and  its  rear  end  down  the  embank- 
ment, 10  or  12  feet  from  the  track.  This  car  remained  coupled  to 
the  fifth  sleeping  car,  which  was  also  entirely  derailed,  with  its  for- 
ward end  down  the  embankment,  while  the  rear  end  remained  on 
the  roadbed  close  to  the  left  rail,  with  the  body  of  the  car  inclined 
at  an  angle  of  about  45  degrees.  The  remaining  three  sleeping  cars 
came  to  rest  in  an  upright  position  close  to  the  rails. 

Examination  of  the  track  showed  that  the  first  marks  of  derail- 
ment weTe  at  a  broken  rail  on  the  inside  or  left  of  the  curve,  at  a 
point  about  150  feet  back  of  the  last  car  in  the  train.  The  receiving 
end  of  this  rail  was  intact  for  a  distance  of  23  feet  6  inches,  and  re- 
mained upright  and  spiked  in  its  proper  position.  The  running  sur- 
face was  slightly  beveled  at  the  break,  indicating  that  a  few  wheels 
had  passed  over  it.  The  remainder  of  the  rail  was  broken  into  many 
pieces,  32  of  which  were  recovered;  these  32  pieces  constituted  only 
a  small  portion  of  the  leaving  end.  The  receiving  end  of  the  next 
rail  on  the  west  remained  in  place,  with  the  rail  joints  and  the  end 
badly  battered  by  wheels  passing  over  them.  This  rail  was  intact  for 
a  distance  of  30  feet  6  inches.  The  balance  of  the  leaving  end,  to- 
gether with  the  seven  adjoining  rails,  was  torn  out  of  the  track  by 
the  derailed  equipment.  None  of  the  rails  on  the  outside  of  the  curve 
was  disturbed  in  any  way.  The  first  flange  marks  on  the  ties  were 
on  the  left  sides  of  both  rails,  and  were  first  visible  opposite  the  first 
broken  rail  at  the  end  of  the  receiving  portion  of  23  feet  6  inches. 
Careful  examination  failed  to  disclose  any  marks  indicating  that  any 
portion  of  the  train  had  been  derailed  before  reaching  this  point. 

Engineman  Venn,  of  engine  923,  stated  that  he  shut  off  steam  a 
short  distance  beyond  Rea,  at  which  time  the  speed  of  the  train  was 
about  45  miles  an  hour,  and  that  he  reduced  this  speed  to  about  35 
miles  an  hour  on  the  curve  just  east  of  Wyeth.  The  speed  then  in- 
creased slightly  on  the  descending  grade  and  was  about  40  miles  an 
hour  at  the  time  of  the  derailment.  He  did  not  notice  any  jar  or 
unusual  motion  of  the  engine  when  passing  over  the  point  of  derail- 
ment, and  had  started  to  work  steam  when  the  brakes  were  applied 
from  the  rear:  at  this  time  his  engine  was  at  the  eastern  end  of  the 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO.  3 

bridge.  He  at  once  placed  his  brake  valve  in  the  lap  position,  and 
then  changed  it  to  the  emergency  position.  He  stated  that  he  did  not 
make  any  detailed  examination  of  the  track,  but  from  his  observa- 
tions concluded  that  a  broken  rail  was  responsible.  He  considered 
the  track  to  be  in  fair  condition  and  safe  for  the  speed  at  which  his 
train  was  running. 

Fireman  Hutchings,  of  engine  923,  said  that  he  did  not  notice 
any  unusual  motion  of  the  engine.  His  first  knowledge  of  the  derail- 
ment was  when  he  felt  the  brakes  applied.  At  this  time  he  was  rid- 
ing on  his  seat  and  on  looking  back  he  saw  the  day  coach  going 
down  the  embankment.  He  thought  the  speed  of  the  train  at  the 
time  was  about  35  or  40  miles  an  hour. 

Engineman  Peavy,  of  engine  286,  stated  that  he  shut  off  steam 
about  4  miles  east  of  the  point  of  derailment.  The  speed  was  re- 
duced between  Rea  and  Wyeth  by  an  application  of  the  air  brakes, 
and  again  when  passing  Wyeth.  The  balance  of  his  statements 
corroborated  those  of  Engineman  Venn.  The  statements  of  Fireman 
Wilcox,  of  engine  286,  added  nothing  to  those  of  Engineman  Peavy. 

Conductor  Cavanaugh  stated  that  he  was  riding  in  the  forward 
end  of  the  smoking  car  when  he  felt  a  severe  jar,  as  though  the  car 
had  been  derailed,  and  he  at  once  pulled  the  emergency  cord  for  the 
purpose  of  stopping  the  train.  He  estimated  the  speed  to  have  been 
from  40  to  45  miles  an  hour.  Shortly  after  the  accident  he  went 
back  to  the  rear  of  the  train,  but  did  not  make  a  detailed  examina- 
tion of  the  track,  concluding  that  a  broken  rail  was  responsible  for 
the  accident. 

P.  A.  Nolden,  employed  in  the  engineering  department  of  the 
railway,  was  a  passenger  on  the  train.  Shortly  after  it  was  derailed 
he  went  back  to  examine  the  track,  and  about  100  or  150  feet  beyond 
the  rear  of  the  train  he  found  a  broken  rail,  the  leaving  end  of 
which  was  broken  into  a  number  of  pieces,  while  the  receiving  end 
was  intact.  The  next  rail  on  the  west  was  also  broken  on  the  leav- 
ing end. 

Track  Supervisor  Millett  stated  that  he  reached  the  scene  of  the 
accident  at  about  10.30  a.  m.  Examination  of  the  first  broken  rail 
disclosed  a  flaw  in  the  head.  He  saw  nothing  on  the  running  surface 
of  the  rail  to  indicate  that  it  was  defective.  He  also  found  a  crack 
in  the  head  of  the  receiving  portion  of  this  rail  which  extended  back 
into  the  rail.  In  his  opinion  the  defect  in  this  rail  was  such  that  it 
could  not  have  been  detected  without  lying  down  on  the  ground. 
He  thought  that  the  break  at  the  leaving  end  of  the  adjoining  rail 
was  due  to  the  derailed  equipment.  He  also  said  that  he  had  passed 
over  the  track  on  the  preceding  day,  and  at  that  time  did  not  notice 
any  indication  of  anything  wrong.    The  superelevation  on  the  curve 


4  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

was  2  inches,  and  he  considered  it  safe  for  a  speed  of  50  miles  an 
hour. 

The  investigation  clearly  developed  that  the  accident  was  due  to 
a  broken  rail,  which  apparently  had  been  in  a  defective  condition 
for  a  considerable  length  of  time.  The  examination  to  determine 
the  reason  for  the  failure  of  this  rail  was  conducted  by  Mr.  James 
K.  Howard,  engineer-physicist,  whose  report  immediately  follows: 

REPORT  OF  THE  ENGINEER-PHYSICIST. 

The  derailment  of  train  No.  3  was  due  to  the  failure  of  a  rail,  the 
leaving  end  of  which  was  broken  into  a  number  of  small  fragments. 
The  receiving  end,  for  a  length  of  23  feet  6  inches,  remained  intact. 
The  type  of  rupture  displayed  was  a  split-head  fracture.  A  ver- 
tical plane  of  rupture  was  developed  which  nearly  separated  the 
head  into  halves,  which  extended  along  the  length  of  the  rail  for  a 
distance  of  13  feet.  Of  this  section,  9  feet  6  inches  was  broken  into 
small  fragments,  32  being  recovered. 

The  rail  was  85  pounds  weight,  A.  S.  C.  E.  section,  rolled  in  Sep- 
tember, 1904,  and  laid  in  the  track  in  October  of  that  year.  Its  age 
was  therefore  15  years  3  months.  It  was  made  of  Bessemer  steel, 
heat  number  46664,  and  branded  "  Illinois  Steel  Co.  So.  Wks.  IX 
1904  8504." 

This  rail  presented  a  common  type  of  rupture,  the  characteristics 
of  which  are  illustrated  in  the  several  cuts  herewith,  reproduced  from 
photographs  and  sulphur  prints.  In  rails  with  split  heads  a  lon- 
gitudinal, vertical  plane  of  rupture  is  developed,  located  along  the 
middle  of  the  width  of  the  head.  The  origin  of  the  plane  of  rupture 
is  an  interior  one,  located  about  one-quarter  of  an  inch,  more  or 
less,  below  the  running  surface  of  the  head.  The  shallow  zone  above 
the  origin  of  the  rupture  remains  unbroken  until  the  last  stages  of 
failure  are  reached.  In  the  development  of  the  split  head  the  plane 
of  rupture  extends  downward  until  abreast  the  junction  of  the  head 
and  the  web.  Here  it  commonly  bifurcates,  the  branches  extending 
right  and  left  toward  the  fillets  under  the  head.  Final  rupture 
occurs  by  the  complete  separation  of  the  halves  of  the  head  and 
their  detachment  from  the  web.  At  the  upper  initial  edge  of  the 
plane  of  rupture  a  small  v-shaped  ridge  of  metal,  attached  to  the 
upper  zone  of  metal,  is  frequently  found.  This  acts  as  a  wedge  to 
separate  the  walls  of  the  fracture. 

The  incipient  point  of  rupture,  in  respect  to  the  length  of  the 
rail,  was  somewhere  in  the  9-foot  6-inch  section,  which  was  broken 
into  small  fragments.  The  characteristics  of  the  metal  of  the  rail 
were  similar  along  this  portion  of  its  length  and  in  the  unbroken 
part  adjacent  thereto.  The  photographic  cuts  and  sulphur  prints 
represent  the  adjacent  metal. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO.  5 

Figure  No.  1  shows  the  appearance  of  the  rail,  in  cross  section, 
near  the  fractured  portion,  after  polishing  and  etching  with  tincture 
of  iodine.  The  upper  edge  of  the  plane  of  rupture  is  characterized 
by  the  presence  of  markings  on  the  end  surface  revealed  by  the  tinc- 
ture of  iodine.  These  markings,  here  viewed  on  end,  represent 
longitudinal  streaks  in  the  steel.  They  are  lines  of  structural  weak- 
ness, affecting  the  metal  under  crosswise  strains. 

The  split  in  the  head,  shown  at  this  stage  of  development,  is  much 
wider  at  its  upper  edge  than  elsewhere.  The  wedge-shaped  rib  of 
metal  at  its  upper  edge  is  forced  by  the  successive  wheel  pressures 
between  the  faces  of  rupture,  thereby  increasing  the  width  of  the 
head. 

The  plane  of  rupture  separated  into  two  branches.  One  branch 
extended  and  reached  the  periphery  of  the  section  at  the  fillet  under 
the  head  on  the  outside  of  the  rail.  The  other  branch  extended  to- 
ward the  gauge  side  of  the  rail  and  appears  in  a  partially  developed 
stage. 

Figure  No.  2  is  a  side  view  of  the  rail  showing  the  line  of  rupture 
under  the  head  which  had  reached  the  peripheral  surface.  Figure 
No.  3  is  an  endwise  view  farther  along  the  length  of  the  rail,  where 
the  split  in  the  head  was  less  developed.  Fractures  of  this  kind  do 
not  always  continue  in  an  unbroken  course,  but  deviate  under  the  in- 
fluence of  contiguous  streaks  in  the  metal.  The  end  surface  shown 
in  this  cut  was  polished  and  then  etched  with  tincture  of  iodine. 

Figure  No.  4  is  a  sulphur  print  of  the  end  surface  shown  by  figure 
No.  3.  The  markings  are  substantially  the  same  as  those  revealed  by 
the  use  of  iodine.  Figures  Nos.  5  and  6  are  sulphur  prints  of  longi- 
tudinal surfaces  of  the  head  and  base,  respectively,  each  about  one- 
fourth  inch  below  the  peripheral  surfaces.  Other  sulphur  prints  at 
different  depths  showed  similar  longitudinal  streaks,  but  not  coin- 
ciding with  those  on  surfaces  near  by. 

Figure  No.  7  represents  the  rail  in  cross  section  at  a  place  where 
the  head  was  intact.  The  iodine  markings  show  the  continuance  of 
the  structural  conditions  which  prevailed  in  other  parts  of  the  rail. 
Figure  No.  8  represents  another  part  of  the  rail  where  the  head  was 
intact.  This  section  was  pickled  in  hot  hydrochloric  acid.  The  same 
characteristic  markings  appear  on  the  cross  sections,  whether  re- 
vealed by  polishing  and  etching  with  tincture  of  iodine,  by  means 
of  sulphur  prints,  or  upon  pickling  in  hot  acid. 

Photomicrographs  of  this  rail  will  be  presented  and  discussed  in 
a  later  part  of  the  report.  Illustrations  are  herewith  presented  of 
other  rails  which  have  failed  and  caused  derailments — failures  which 
were  influenced  by  the  structural  state  of  the  metal. 

Figures  Nos.  9  to  13,  inclusive,  represent  a  rail  which  failed  on 
March  30,  1920,  causing  the  derailment  of  train  No.  Ill,  near  Savan, 


b  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

Pa.,  on  the  Indiana  Branch  of  the  Buffalo,  Rochester  &  Pittsburgh 
Railway  Co.  This  was  an  80-pound  rail  rolled  by  the  Carnegie  Steel 
Co.  It  failed  by  the  development  of  a  fracture  under  the  head,  at 
the  junction  of  the  web.  Its  development  was  progressive,  having  its 
origin  at  a  zone  of  streaked  metal.  The  head  was  detached  from  the 
web,  followed  by  the  fracture  of  the  web  and  the  base. 

Two  views  of  the  principal  surfaces  of  rupture  are  shown  by  fig- 
ures Nos.  9  and  10.  Figure  No.  9  is  looking  up,  at  the  under  side  of  the 
head.  Figure  No.  10  is  looking  down,  on  the  upper  edge  of  the 
web.  The  surfaces  of  progressive  fractures  wherever  found  are 
similar  in  appearance,  leaving  no  doubt  concerning  their  identity. 
The  characteristics  of  fractured  surfaces  commonly  furnish  reliable 
evidence  upon  the  manner  of  failure  of  steel  members. 

Opportunity  was  taken  to  further  examine  the  Savan  rail  in  quest 
of  surface  seaminess — a  condition  of  the  metal  of  the  base  which  has 
led  to  many  fractured  rails.  The  results  are  shown  by  figures  Nos. 
11  and  12.  Figure  No.  11  represents  the  appearance  of  the  base  of 
the  rail,  two  fragments,  as  it  appeared  when  removed  from  the  track. 
Spike-maul  marks  are  shown  on  the  left-hand  figure  of  the  cut. 
Figure  No.  12  shows  the  appearance  of  the  surface  of  the  base  after 
pickling  in  hot  hydrochloric  acid.  Surface  seaminess,  not  in  evi- 
dence on  the  rail  as  it  came  from  the  track,  was  revealed  upon  pick- 
ling. 

Two  end  surfaces  of  the  Savan  rail  as  they  appeared  after  pickling 
are  shown  by  figure  No.  13. 

Figures  Nos.  14  to  18,  inclusive,  represent  a  rail  which  failed  on 
January  19,  1921,  causing  the  derailment  of  train  No.  9,  of  the  Erie 
Railroad,  near  Friendship,  N.  Y.  This  was  a  90-pound  rail  rolled 
by  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  and  was  branded  "  Carnegie  1909  E.  T. 
IIIIIIII  90  A."  It  illustrates  a  piped  rail,  in  connection  with  which 
a  split-head  fracture  developed. 

Split-head  rails  are  often  erroneously  reported  as  piped  rails. 
The  primary  causes  which  lead  to  the  failure  of  these  two  types  are 
distinctly  different,  and  their  origins  are  located  in  different  parts 
of  the  cross  section  of  the  rail.  A  split-head  fracture  has  its  origin 
in  the  upper  part  of  the  head.  A  piped  rail  has  a  plane  of  separa- 
tion in  the  web  and  lower  part  of  the  head.  Split-head  rails  are  of 
frequent  occurrence,  while  piped  rails  are  not.  A  split-head  fracture 
may  occur  in  conjunction  with  a  piped  rail  as  the  present  rail 
shows — a  matter  not  affecting  their  separate  origins. 

Figure  No.  14  shows  the  hot  sawed  end  of  the  Friendship  rail. 
The  vertical  line  of  separation  in  the  web  shows  the  characteristic 
feature  of  a  piped  rail.  This  rail  displayed  a  composite  fracture 
in  which  its  piped  condition  was  probably  the  leading  cause.  Asso- 
ciated with  the  plane  of  rupture  in  the  web,  there  was  a  horizontal 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO.  7 

shearing  fracture  in  the  head  and  also  a  split-head  fracture.  The 
piped  state  of  the  rail  was  embraced  in  part  and  reenforced  by  the 
splice  bars.  The  support  given  the  rail  by  the  splice  bars  doubt- 
less accounts  for  the  display  of  the  several  types  of  rupture  in  imme- 
diate association  with  each  other. 

Figure  No.  15  is  a  side  view  of  this  rail  showing  the  fractured  sur- 
face of  the  web  between  the  bolt  holes  and  partially  exposed  a  short 
distance  beyond.  Above  this  portion  of  its  length  the  head  of  the 
rail  was  broken  in  a  crosswise  direction  in  addition  to  a  vertical 
plane  of  rupture  which  nearly  separated  it  into  halves.  Both  the 
pipe  and  the  split-head  fracture  continued  beyond  the  limits  of  this 
photograph. 

Figure  No.  16  is  a  view  in  cross  section  of  the  Friendship  rail 
farther  along  its  length,  photographed  after  polishing  and  etching 
with  tincture  of  iodine.  The  pipe  extended  into  this  section.  The 
opposite  faces  were  in  close  proximity  to  each  other,  hence  the  pipe 
does  not  show  in  this  cut.  The  split  in  the  head  had  separated  and 
is  clearly  visible. 

Figure  No.  17  is  a  sulphur  print  of  the  Friendship  rail  at  a  place 
where  the  pipe  was  clearly  visible,  and  also  where  the  split  in  the 
head  was  in  an  advanced  stage.  A  lateral  branch  of  the  split-head 
fracture  had  nearly  reached  the  peripheral  surface  of  the  rail  at  the 
fillet  under  the  head  on  the  gauge  side.  The  fracture  of  the  rail  at 
this  point  is  of  interest  in  showing  the  dominating  influence  of  the 
wheel  pressures  in  relation  to  fractures  in  the  head.  The  formation 
of  a  lateral  branch  of  the  split-head  fracture  doubtless  resulted  from 
the  wheel  pressures  exerting  a  spreading  effect  on  the  metal  at  the 
top  of  the  head.  In  the  order  of  development  the  formation  of  this 
lateral  branch  probably  was  the  last  part  of  the  fracture  to  occur. 
The  walls  of  the  split-head  fracture  were  separated  by  the  wedge 
action  of  the  cold-rolled  metal  of  the  top  of  the  head.  When  the 
medial  line  of  pressure  between  the  wheel  and  the  rail  occurs  near 
either  the  gauge  side  or  the  outside  edge  of  the  head  there  is  an 
overturning  moment  applied  to  the  head.  Such  eccentric  loading 
leads  to  the  bifurcation  of  the  line  of  rupture  in  the  case  of  a  split 
head.  The  different  contours  of  the  treads  of  wheels  are  responsible 
for  different  elements  along  the  running  surface  receiving  the  max- 
imum impinging  pressures  and  causing  the  alternate  loading  of  one 
side  and  then  the  other  of  the  head  of  the  rail.  This  alternate  eccen- 
tric loading  of  the  head  accounts  for  the  bifurcation  of  the  vertical 
plane  of  rupture  in  a  split-head  rail  abreast  the  junction  of  the  head 
and  the  web  where  bending  stresses  in  crosswise  direction  under  such 
circumstances  attain  high  limits.  It  will  be  inferred  from  the  present 
exhibit  and  the  remarks  which  are  submitted  that  relatively  there 
is  a  greater  tendency,  under  the  influence  of  track  conditions,  for 


8  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

a  rail  to  fail  by  the  development  of  a  split  head  than  by  reason  of 
the  presence  of  a  pipe. 

Figure  No.  18  shoiws  the  appearance  of  the  Friendship  rail  after 
pickling  in  hot  acid  at  the  cross  section  upon  which  the  preceding 
sulphur  print  was  taken.  Greater  solubility  of  the  metal  takes  place 
at  those  places  which  are  stained  by  the  iodine,  or  marked  on  the 
sulphur  print,  than  on  other  parts  of  the  cross  section,  resulting  in 
the  close  similarity  of  the  illustrations  furnished  by  these  three 
methods. 

In  the  study  of  the  failure  of  steel,  attention  centers  upon  one 
principal  feature  and  the  relations  of  subordinate  features  to  the 
principal  one.  The  principal  feature  relates  to  the  stress  or  strain, 
mutually  related  factors,  which  the  metal  is  capable  of  enduring  and 
the  manner  in  which  limiting  values  in  terms  of  stress  or  strain  are 
reached.  In  plainer  language,  it  is  desired  to  know  what  loads  the 
steel  will  carry ;  what  relations  the  properties  of  the  metal  which  are 
shown  under  test  bear  to  the  endurance  of  service  conditions ;  whether 
any  part  of  the  elongation  displayed  in  the  tensile  test  or  the  con- 
traction of  area  then  displayed  will  be  realized  in  service;  whether 
the  ultimate  tensile  strength  of  the  steel  represents  a  particular  value 
to  the  rail  when  in  service ;  whether  the  ductility  clause  of  the  drop 
test  has  any  real  significance;  whether  the  drop  test  itself  has  any 
definite  relation  to  the  serviceability  of  the  rail.  These  and  other 
queries  suggest  themselves.  Chemical  composition  and  finishing  tem- 
peratures are  factors  which  influence  and  control  physical  properties 
in  rolled  shapes — established  by  the  laws  of  nature  and  not  by  speci- 
fications. 

Opportunity  occasionally  offers  to  acquire  data  touching  upon 
some  of  the  above  queries.  On  the  present  occasion  microscopic  ob- 
servations were  made  upon  the  structural  appearance  of  the  metal 
of  the  Wyeth  rail  adjacent  to  the  running  surface  of  the  head,  at 
the  upper  terminal  of  the  split-head  fracture,  and  at  the  lower  ter- 
minals of  the  bifurcated  fracture.  The  observations  were  directed 
to  the  distortion  of  the  grain  of  the  steel  adjacent  to  the  running 
surface,  where  flattening  and  flow  occur  immediately,  due  to  the 
wheel  pressures,  and  noting  the  undistorted  shape  of  the  grains  at 
the  split-head  fracture. 

The  metal  of  this  rail  was  capable  of  displaying  ductile  flow.  The 
distorted  shape  of  the  grain  next  the  running  surface  and  the  for- 
mation of  a  fin  along  each  edge  of  the  head  is  evidence  thereof.  At 
the  terminals  of  the  split-head  fracture  and  the  apex  of  the  wedge- 
shaped  rib  at  the  upper  edge  of  the  split-head  fracture  there  was, 
however,  no  appreciable  distortion  of  the  grain.  At  these  places, 
microscopically,  there  was  absent  any  evidence  of  an  appreciable  per- 
manent set  of  the  steel  having  taken  place.     Ductile  flow  and  brittle- 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   WYETH,    MO.  9 

ness  in  the  same  rail  are  here  shown,  the  result  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  stresses  were  received.  The  same  is  true  of  other  carbon 
steel  rails.  Whether  any  part  of  the  elongation  or  contraction  of 
area  of  the  tensile  test  is  displayed  in  service  depends  upon  the  man- 
ner in  which  those  features  are  developed. 

A  series  of  four  photomicrographs  was  taken  along  the  upper  zone 
of  the  head  of  the  Wyeth  rail,  showing  the  shape  of  the  grain  of  the 
steel  within  the  zone  directly  affected  by  the  wheel  pressures.  Each 
represents  the  metal  of  the  rail  in  cross  section,  and  each  at  a  mag- 
nification of  100  diameters.  Fig.  No.  19  represents  the  shape  of  the 
grain  near  the  running  surface  of  the  head  about  in  line  with  the 
gauge  side  of  the  web,  that  is,  not  far  from  the  middle  of  the  width 
of  the  head.  The  grains  were  slightly  flattened  along  this  element, 
the  distortion  hot  being  very  pronounced.  This  element  appeared  to 
be  within  the  neutral  axis  with  respect  to  distortion  and  direction  of 
flow  of  surface  metal. 

Figure  No.  20  shows  the  distortion  of  the  grain  at  a  place  nearer 
the  gauge  side  of  the  head.  The  flattening  of  the  grain  here  is  very 
pronounced,  with  a  drift  toward  the  gauge  side.  Figure  No.  21 
shows  the  distortion  of  the  grain  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  center 
line  of  the  head.  The  flattening  of  the  grain  and  drift  toward  the 
outside  edge  of  the  head  is  here  also  very  pronounced.  A  fin  was 
formed  along  each  edge  of  the  head,  the  metal  to  form  which  neces- 
sarily came  from  the  upper  part  of  the  head.  Under  such  circum- 
stances it  is  quite  evident  there  would  be  a  neutral  element  on  either 
side  of  which  the  surface  flow  would  take  place  in  opposite  direc- 
tions, as  these  photomicrographs  indicate.  The  flow  of  metal  at  the 
extreme  outside  edge  of  the  head  showed  a  laminated  state,  as  illus- 
trated by  Figure  No.  22.  The  laminations  were  separated  and  in- 
dividually broken.  The  dark  Z-shaped  lines  on  the  cut  represent 
lines  of  fracture. 

The  depth  of  the  zone  of  distorted  grain  was  about  five-hundredths 
of  an  inch.  Below  this  depth  normal  shape  of  grain  prevailed.  A 
feature  of  interest  is  raised  in  this  connection — namely,  that  micro- 
scopic evidence  is  not  presented  showing  a  disturbance  of  the  struc- 
tural state  of  the  metal  so  far  down  as  the  origins  of  split-head  frac- 
tures are  located.  Evidence  of  a  state  of  internal  compression  in  the 
upper  part  of  the  head  does  not  rest  upon  microscopic  indications, 
but  upon  the  results  of  strain  gauge  measurements.  In  comparing 
the  results  of  strain  gauge  measurements  with  the  indications  of  the 
microscope  it  has  not  been  made  clear  that  the  presence  of  internal 
strains  of  either  tension  or  compression  may  be  recognized  with  the 
aid  of  the  microscope.  If  such  was  the  case  the  most  far-reaching 
results  would  come  from  the  use  of  the  microscope  in  ascertaining 
the  existing  states  of  strain  in  all  kinds  of  engineering  structures. 
47603—21 2 


10  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

Figure  No.  23  represents  the  apex  of  the  wedge-shaped  rib  at  the 
upper  terminal  of  the  split-head  fracture  shown  by  figure  No.  1. 
There  was  no  distortion  of  the  grain  at  the  apex  of  this  wedge.  This 
illustration  touches  upon  another  feature  in  the  behavior  of  metals — 
namely,  that  cubic  compression,  however  great,  and  it  has  been 
observed  up  to  a  pressure  of  117,000  pounds  per  square  inch,  has  no 
permanent  effect  upon  the  structural  state  of  the  steel.  The  wedging 
apart  of  the  split-head  fracture,  therefore,  does  not  demand  there 
should  be  of  necessity  a  distortion  of  the  grain  of  the  wedging  mem- 
ber. 

Figure  No.  24  shows  the  termination  of  the  shorter  branch  of  the 
bifurcated  split-head  fracture  illustrated  in  figure  No.  1.  The  crack 
in  the  steel  is  indicated  by  the  oblique  irregular  line  which  ap- 
pears in  the  cut,  darker  than  the  ferrite  boundaries  of  the  grains  and 
lighter  than  the  pearlite  grains.  This  appearance  of  the  crack  is  due 
to  its  being  filled  with  iron  rust. 

Figure  No.  25  shows  the  termination  of  the  split-head  fracture 
illustrated  in  figure  No.  3.  The  plane  of  the  fracture  at  this  place 
had  deflected  and  approached  nearer  the  fillet  under  the  head  than 
shown  by  figure  No.  1.  The  irregular  black  line  extending  obliquely 
downward  in  this  cut  represents  the  termination  of  the  crack.  The 
surfaces  of  the  fracture  were  not  oxidized  in  this  case. 

The  last  two  photomicrographs  illustrate  this  feature :  That  a 
plane  of  rupture  may  pass  into  or  through  a  steel  member  without 
change  in  shape  of  the  grain,  and  therefore  without  display  of  ap- 
preciable ductility.  This  has  been  found  true  in  different  grades  of 
steel.  The  behavior  of  rails  in  service  furnishes  the  basis  for  the 
query  concerning  the  value  in  itself  of  the  ductility  clause  of  specifica- 
tions. A  greater  or  less  display  of  elongation  will  take  place  in 
steels,  depending  upon  their  composition,  when  tested  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  permit  of  the  display  of  ductility;  that  is,  certain  steels 
inherently  possess  such  ability  by  reason  of  their  chemical  composi- 
tion. Specifications  can  enumerate  these  numerical  values,  but  with- 
out changing  the  results.  These  remarks  are  made  because  the 
failures  of  materials  are  often  attributed  to  lack  in  meeting  specifica- 
tions, when  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  relation  between  the  specified 
properties  and  the  ability  of  the  material  to  endure  service  stresses 
has  not  been  given  consideration.  This  is  a  plea  for  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  specific  causes  which  lead  to  failures,  in  which  those 
of  rails  present  notable  opportunities. 

In  summation,  the  failure  of  the  rail  which  caused  the  present  de- 
railment was  due  to  the  presence  of  a  split-head  fracture.  Wheel 
loads  cause  distortion  of  the  grain  of  the  steel  and  induce  lateral  flow 
of  the  metal  at  the  running  surface  of  the  rail,  the  tendency  of  such 
loads  being  to  spread  the  railheads.     The  successful  resistance  of 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO.  11 

such  lateral  forces  depends  upon  the  structural  soundness  of  the 
metal  in  the  railhead.  Longitudinal  streaks  are  lines  of  weakness 
which  influence  the  formation  of  split-head  fractures  and  locate 
their  incipient  points  of  origin.  Longitudinal  streaks  are  due  to 
casting  and  mill  conditions.  Their  elimination,  or  reduction  in  num- 
bers and  gravity  of  development,  are  matters  for  the  steel  makers  to 
consider.  The  ages  at  which  split-head  rails  manifest  themselves 
indicate  such  fractures  are  of  slow  and  progressive  development.  It 
is  a  matter  of  conjecture,  although  having  the  appearance  of  proba- 
bility, that  split-head  rails  would  be  unknown  if  strictly  seamless 
steel  was  available  for  rails.  The  rail  problem  is  intensified  by  rea- 
son of  the  employment  of  high  wheel  pressures.  Soft  rails  display 
mashed  heads.  Hard  rails  furnish  a  large  number  of  transverse 
fissures. 

There  is  a  popular  fallacy  entertained  that  split-head  rails  do  not 
constitute  a  dangerous  type  of  fracture,  since  at  certain  stages  in 
their  progress  of  rupture  they  may  be  detected  in  the  track.  This 
evidence,  however,  is  presented  at  a  late  stage,  after  the  necessary 
margin  in  strength  in  the  rail  has  been  practically  exhausted,  and 
not  prior  thereto.  An  element  of  danger  has  arisen  when  split-head 
rails  are  detectable  in  the  track.  An  economic  question  is  involved 
in  the  elimination  of  the  causes  of  split-head  failures,  since  many 
rails  are  removed  for  this  cause  which  are  not  otherwise  unservice- 
able. Finally,  split-head  failures  should  not  be  reported  as  piped 
rails. 

SUMMARY. 

The  cause  of  this  accident  is  shown  to  have  been  due  to  the  failure 
of  a  rail  which  displayed  a  split-head  fracture.  The  head  of  the 
rail  was  separated  into  halves  by  a  vertical  plane  of  rupture;  the 
halves  of  the  head  broken  into  fragments,  with  lines  of  rupture  sep- 
arating the  web  and  the  base.  A  portion  of  the  length  of  the  rail 
broke  into  a  number  of  small  fragments. 

As  illustrated  and  described  by  the  engineer-physicist  this  type  of 
fracture  has  its  origin  in  the  upper  part  of  the  head,  the  incipient 
point  being  located  a  short  distance  below  the  running  surface.  It 
also  appears  from  the  best  evidence  on  the  subject  that  split-head 
fractures  are  induced  by  the  presence  of  certain  longitudinal  streaks 
or  seams  in  the  metal,  and  that  such  seams  represent  the  incipient 
places  from  whence  planes  of  rupture  extend  and  destroy  the  rail  in 
the  course  of  their  development. 

It  appears  to  be  well  established  that  split-head  fractures  begin 
in  the  upper  part  of  the  head  and  progressively  extend  downward 
in  substantially  vertical  planes.  When  the  plane  of  rupture  reaches 
a  depth  which  brings  it  abreast  or  nearly  abreast  the  junction  of  the 


12  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

head  and  the  web,  the  plane  of  rupture  commonly  changes  its  course 
or  separates  into  two  branches,  one  of  which  eventually  reaches  the 
periphery  of  the  rail  at  the  fillet  under  the  head.  When  this  stage 
of  rupture  has  been  reached  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  rail  soon  takes 
place. 

The  width  of  the  split  is  narrow  in  comparison  with  its  depth  of 
penetration — a  circumstance  which  renders  the  detection  of  a  split- 
head  rail  uncertain  until  the  period  of  final  rupture  is  close  at  hand. 
This  fact  should  dislodge  a  popular  fallacy  concerning  split-head 
rails — namely,  that  such  fractures  are  easily  detected  in  the  track, 
and  therefore  should  not  occasion  anxiety,  overlooking  the  fact  that 
when  detectable  the  rail  has  reached  a  weakened  condition  and  may 
be  on  the  verge  of  rupture. 

Data  in  the  report  are  presented  on  the  extension  of  cracks  of  in- 
terior origin,  showing  the  absence  of  the  display  of  ductility  of  the 
metal  in  fractures  of  this  class.  Without  the  display  of  ductility,  ex- 
ternal and  visible  evidence  of  impending  rupture  is  evidently  want- 
ing. Methods  of  test  have  been  offered  for  the  detection  of  interior 
fractures  in  rails.  The  development  of  such  apparatus  does  not  ap- 
pear to  have  reached  a  state  in  which  its  application  to  rails  in  the 
track  has  been  attained.  As  the  case  now  stands,  the  early  detection 
of  split-head  rails  in  the  track  depends  upon  the  vigilance  of  the 
track  supervisors  and  the  section  men. 

The  engineer-physicist  has  ventured  the  remark  that  split-head 
rails  would  be  nearly  or  quite  unknown  provided  seamless  steel  was 
found  in  rails.  The  relation  which  seaminess  of  metal  bears  to  split- 
head  rails  appears  to  furnish  a  basis  for  this  remark.  It  commonly 
takes  years  of  service  to  develop  split-head  fractures,  which  gives 
encouragement  to  the  thought  that  an  improvement  in  the  struc- 
tural state  of  the  steel  would  measurably  prolong  the  lives  of  cer- 
tain rails.  Elements  of  safety  and  economy  would  be  subserved  if 
the  primary  cause  in  the  formation  of  split-head  failures  was  re- 
moved or  the  influence  of  such  cause  measurably  lessened. 

No  comprehensive  consideration  can  be  given  the  subject  of  rail 
failures  without  taking  into  account  the  effects  of  high  wheel  loads, 
effects  which  are  destructive  in  their  character.  Regardless  of 
whether  responsibility  in  the  abstract  attaches  chiefly  to  the  makers 
or  the  users  of  rails,  statistics  show  that  a  considerable  number  of 
rails  fail  under  present  conditions  of  service.  A  reduction  in  the 
number  is  highly  desirable.  In  respect  to  the  display  of  split-head 
failures,  promise  of  improvement  appears  to  lie  in  the  direction  of 
using  steel  of  less  seamy  state. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

W.  P.  Borland, 
Chief,  Bureau  of  Safety. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO. 


13 


Fia.A 


F19.B 

Fig. A  Typical  split  head  fracture. 
Fia.B  Typical  piped  rail. 


14 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Fig.  1. — End  view  of  rail  polished  and  etched  with  tincture  of  iodine,  showing 
relations  of  markings  in  upper  part  of  head  and  origin  of  split  head  fracture. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   WYKTH,    MO. 


15 


Fig.  2. — Side  view  of  rail,  showing  longitudinal  crack  at  the  fillet  under  the 
head,  where  split  head  fracture  had  reached  the  peripheral  surface  of  the 
rail. 


16 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Fig.  3. — End  view  of  rail,  polished  and  etched  with  tincture  of  iodine.  Cross 
section  of  rail  where  split  head  fracture  was  less  developed  than  where  shown 
by  figure  1. 


ACCIDENT   NEAE    WYETH,    MO. 


17 


Fig.  4. — Sulphur  print  of  surface  shown  by  figure  3. 
47603—21 3 


18 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


.   *  _■   --.  * 


vtycs 


«"— '.        — 


r.-*n    «— *--    HOin  .11,  If.  ■>     ""i*~«»«Vt^»i*— JtfPM 


Fig.    5.— Sulphur    print    of    longitudinal,    horizontal    surface    of    head    of    rail,    V 
planed  off  the  running  surface. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO. 


19 


m>    '  g.i^iir  'ffiiejjjfgfrfjtm,'.  I'm'j^tmmi  ^,<y^-~ 


W&IBm&umfTmw  **~i  ir,  &_¥*•* '.'« »»miwi«»:<«^- 


«'«-*:  ^s^sfe  r.-^.*>?^rr-,-^;' 


Fig.   6. — Sulphur  print  of  longitudinal,   horizontal    surface   of   base  of  rail,    \' 
planed  off  the  bottom  of  the  base. 


20 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


Fig.  7. — Appearance  of  cross  section  of  rail,  where  head  was  intact,  polished 
and  etched  with  tincture  of  iodine. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   WYETH,    MO 


21 


Mi 
S 


$* 


■  ■■'.  S« ' 

f 


..»s>sstfp 


■M&&* 


"t;;#>>v^  r.  >K>v'. 


'._''_'     &i*^ 


&4 


Fig.   8. — Appearance   of   cross   section   of  rail,   where   head  was   intact,   after 
pickling  in  hot   hydrochloric  acid. 


22 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


>  -a 


o  S 


ACCIDENT    NEAR    WYETH,    MO. 


23 


24 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


SfflHH 


Pig.   11. — 80-pound   rail  which  failed  near   Savan,  Pa.     Appearance  of  base  before 

pickling  in  hot  acid. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO. 


25 


Fig.   12. — 80-pound   rail  which  failed  near  Savan,  Pa.     Appearance  of  base  after 

pickling  in  hot  acid. 


26 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO. 


27 


Fig.  14. — 90-pound  rail  which  failed  near  Friendship,  N.  Y.,  Erie  Railroad. 
View  of  hot  sawed  end  showing  piped  fracture  in  web,  and  horizontal 
shearing  fracture  in  the  head. 


28 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


ACCIDENT    NEAR    WYETH,    MO. 


29 


Fig.  16. — 90-pound  rail  which  failed  near  Friendship,  N.  Y.  Cross  section,  at 
place  beyond  the  limits  of  figure  15.  Pipe  in  web  obscurely  shown,  split 
in  head  visible. 


30 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION". 


Fig.  17.- — 90-pound  rail  which  failed  near  Friendship,  N.  Y.  Sulphur  print  at  a 
place  where  it  exhibited  a  piped  web  and  a  split  head  fracture,  a  branch  ex- 
tending in  the  direction  of  the  fillet  on  the  gauge  side  of  the  web. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   WYETH,   MO. 


31 


Fig.   18. — 90-pound  rail  which  failed  near  Friendship,  N.  Y.     Appearance  after 
pickling  in  hot  acid,  same  cross  section  as  shown   by  figure  17. 


32 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Fig.  19. — Photomicrograph  of  Wyeth  rail,  cross  section 
shown  by  figure  7,  just  below  running  surface,  about 
in  line  with  gauge  side  of  web,  showing  flattening 
of  the  grain  by  wheel  pressures.  Magnification  100 
diameters. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,    MO. 


33 


Fig.  20. — Wyeth  rail,  same  surface  as  shown  by  figure 
19.  Showing  flattening  of  the  grain  and  flow  toward 
gauge  side  of  head,  at  a  place  between  gauge  side  of 
head  and  surface  shown  by  figure  19.  Magnification 
100  diameters. 


34 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Fig.  21. — Wyeth  rail,  same  surface  as  shown  by  figure  19. 
Showing  flattening  of  the  grain  and  flow  toward  the 
outside  of  the  head,  at  a  place  between  the  outside 
of  the  head  and  surface  shown  by  figure  19.  Magnifica- 
tion 100  diameters. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WYETH,   MO. 


35 


Fig.  22. — Wyeth  rail,  same  surface  as  shown  by  figure  19. 
Showing  laminated  structure  of  the  fin  formed  along 
the  outside  edge  of  the  head.  Laminations  separated 
and  individually  broken.  Z-shaped  dark  lines  indicate 
lines  of  rupture.     Magnification  100  diameters. 


36 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Fig.  23. — Yyeth  rail.  Microstructure  of  apex  of  wedge- 
shaped  rib  at  upper  terminal  of  split  head  fracture 
Bhown  by  figure  1.  Shapes  of  grains  undisturbed. 
Magnification  100  diameters. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   WYETH,   MO. 


37 


Pig.  24. — Wyeth  rail.  Mierostructure  at  shorter  branch  of 
bifurcated  head  fracture  shown  by  figure  1.  Crack  shown 
by  irregular  oblique  line  intermediate  in  color  between 
the  ferrite  boundaries  and  the  pearlite  grains,  penetrating 
steel  without  distortion  of  the  grain.  Magnification  300 
diameters. 


38 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Fig.  25. — Wyeth  rail.  Micro-structure  at  lower  terminal  of 
split  head  fracture  shown  by  figure  3.  Crack  shown 
by  irregular  dark  line  extending  obliquely  downward, 
penetrating  the  steel  without  distortion  of  the  grain. 
Magnification  300  diameters. 


o 


UNIVERSITY  OF  FLORIDA 


3  1262  08856  1542 


